Overview
This vulnerability occurs when using a block cipher mode like Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) with an Initialization Vector (IV) that is not random and unpredictable for each encryption operation. Common mistakes include using a static (hard-coded) IV, a null IV (all zeros), or an IV derived predictably from data like a timestamp or username. Using the same IV to encrypt different messages with the same key completely undermines CBC’s security, allowing attackers to infer information about the plaintext. 🧊⛓️Business Impact
A predictable IV in CBC mode can allow an attacker to determine if two different encrypted messages start with the same block of plaintext. In some cases, depending on how the application uses the encryption, it can leak partial or full information about the plaintext messages, especially if parts of the message structure are known. This compromises data confidentiality.Reference Details
CWE ID: CWE-329
OWASP Top 10 (2021): A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures
Severity: High
Framework-Specific Analysis and Remediation
Modern cryptographic libraries often generate a random IV automatically when using modes like CBC or GCM. This vulnerability usually arises when developers manually manage the IV and make mistakes. The fix is to always generate a new, cryptographically random IV for every single encryption operation using the same key, and typically prepend the IV to the ciphertext so it can be retrieved for decryption. Note: Authenticated Encryption modes like AES-GCM are generally preferred over CBC + HMAC as they handle both confidentiality and integrity together and often manage the nonce (similar to an IV) generation more seamlessly.- Python
- Java
- .NET(C#)
- PHP
- Node.js
- Ruby
Framework Context
Usingpycryptodome’s AES.new() in CBC mode but providing a static or null IV.Vulnerable Scenario 1: Static IV
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# utils/encryption.py
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
from Crypto.Util.Padding import pad
import os
# DANGEROUS: Using a fixed, hard-coded IV for all encryptions.
STATIC_IV = b'0123456789abcdef' # Must be 16 bytes for AES
def encrypt_static_iv(key, data):
cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, STATIC_IV)
padded_data = pad(data.encode(), AES.block_size)
ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(padded_data)
# Storing IV is usually needed, but here it's static anyway.
return ciphertext
Vulnerable Scenario 2: Null IV (All Zeros)
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# utils/encryption.py
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
from Crypto.Util.Padding import pad
NULL_IV = b'\x00' * 16 # DANGEROUS: Using an IV of all zeros.
def encrypt_null_iv(key, data):
cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, NULL_IV)
padded_data = pad(data.encode(), AES.block_size)
ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(padded_data)
return ciphertext
Mitigation and Best Practices
Generate a fresh, random IV for each encryption usingos.urandom(AES.block_size) or Crypto.Random.get_random_bytes(AES.block_size). Prepend the IV to the ciphertext.Secure Code Example
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# utils/encryption.py (Secure)
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
from Crypto.Random import get_random_bytes
from Crypto.Util.Padding import pad, unpad
def encrypt_random_iv(key, data):
# SECURE: Generate a new random IV for each encryption.
iv = get_random_bytes(AES.block_size) # 16 bytes for AES
cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
padded_data = pad(data.encode(), AES.block_size)
ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(padded_data)
# SECURE: Prepend the IV to the ciphertext before returning/storing.
return iv + ciphertext
def decrypt_random_iv(key, iv_and_ciphertext):
iv = iv_and_ciphertext[:AES.block_size]
ciphertext = iv_and_ciphertext[AES.block_size:]
cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
padded_plaintext = cipher.decrypt(ciphertext)
plaintext = unpad(padded_plaintext, AES.block_size)
return plaintext.decode()
Testing Strategy
Review code usingAES.new with MODE_CBC. Ensure the iv parameter is generated using get_random_bytes or os.urandom inside the encryption function (or passed in as a unique value per call). Check that the IV is stored/transmitted alongside the ciphertext.Framework Context
Usingjavax.crypto.Cipher with AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding but initializing IvParameterSpec with a static or null byte array.Vulnerable Scenario 1: Static IV
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// service/EncryptionService.java
import javax.crypto.Cipher;
import javax.crypto.spec.IvParameterSpec;
import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec;
public class EncryptionService {
// DANGEROUS: Static, predictable IV.
private static final byte[] STATIC_IV = "0123456789abcdef".getBytes();
public byte[] encryptStaticIv(byte[] keyBytes, byte[] data) throws Exception {
SecretKeySpec key = new SecretKeySpec(keyBytes, "AES");
// Using the static IV
IvParameterSpec ivSpec = new IvParameterSpec(STATIC_IV);
Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding");
cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, key, ivSpec);
return cipher.doFinal(data);
}
}
Vulnerable Scenario 2: Null IV (All Zeros)
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// service/EncryptionService.java
public byte[] encryptNullIv(byte[] keyBytes, byte[] data) throws Exception {
SecretKeySpec key = new SecretKeySpec(keyBytes, "AES");
// DANGEROUS: Using a zero-byte IV.
byte[] nullIv = new byte[16]; // Defaults to all zeros
IvParameterSpec ivSpec = new IvParameterSpec(nullIv);
Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding");
cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, key, ivSpec);
return cipher.doFinal(data);
}
Mitigation and Best Practices
Generate a new random IV usingjava.security.SecureRandom for each encryption. Prepend the IV to the ciphertext. Consider using AES-GCM (AES/GCM/NoPadding) which is generally preferred.Secure Code Example
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// service/EncryptionService.java (Secure)
import javax.crypto.Cipher;
import javax.crypto.spec.IvParameterSpec;
import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec;
import java.security.SecureRandom;
public class EncryptionService {
public byte[] encryptRandomIv(byte[] keyBytes, byte[] data) throws Exception {
SecretKeySpec key = new SecretKeySpec(keyBytes, "AES");
Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding");
// SECURE: Generate a new random IV for each encryption.
byte[] iv = new byte[16]; // AES block size is 128 bits = 16 bytes
new SecureRandom().nextBytes(iv);
IvParameterSpec ivSpec = new IvParameterSpec(iv);
cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, key, ivSpec);
byte[] ciphertext = cipher.doFinal(data);
// SECURE: Prepend IV to ciphertext.
byte[] result = new byte[iv.length + ciphertext.length];
System.arraycopy(iv, 0, result, 0, iv.length);
System.arraycopy(ciphertext, 0, result, iv.length, ciphertext.length);
return result;
}
public byte[] decryptRandomIv(byte[] keyBytes, byte[] ivAndCiphertext) throws Exception {
SecretKeySpec key = new SecretKeySpec(keyBytes, "AES");
Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding");
byte[] iv = Arrays.copyOfRange(ivAndCiphertext, 0, 16);
byte[] ciphertext = Arrays.copyOfRange(ivAndCiphertext, 16, ivAndCiphertext.length);
IvParameterSpec ivSpec = new IvParameterSpec(iv);
cipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, key, ivSpec);
return cipher.doFinal(ciphertext);
}
}
Testing Strategy
Review code initializingIvParameterSpec. Ensure the byte array comes from SecureRandom.nextBytes() generated within the encryption method or passed uniquely per call. Verify the IV is prepended/stored.Framework Context
Using classes likeAesCryptoServiceProvider or Aes.Create() in CBC mode but setting the IV property to a static or null value.Vulnerable Scenario 1: Static IV
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// Services/EncryptionHelper.cs
using System.Security.Cryptography;
using System.Text;
public class EncryptionHelper
{
private readonly byte[] _key;
// DANGEROUS: Static IV used for all encryptions.
private static readonly byte[] StaticIv = Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes("myStaticIv123456"); // 16 bytes
public EncryptionHelper(byte[] key) { _key = key; }
public byte[] EncryptStaticIv(byte[] data)
{
using (var aes = Aes.Create())
{
aes.Key = _key;
aes.IV = StaticIv; // Using static IV
aes.Mode = CipherMode.CBC;
using (var encryptor = aes.CreateEncryptor(aes.Key, aes.IV))
// ... encryption logic ...
}
}
}
Vulnerable Scenario 2: Default (Null) IV
Forgetting to set the IV property, which might default to zeros.Copy
// Services/EncryptionHelper.cs
public byte[] EncryptDefaultIv(byte[] data)
{
using (var aes = Aes.Create())
{
aes.Key = _key;
// DANGEROUS: IV is not explicitly set. Depending on the provider,
// it might default to zeros or be reused if the Aes object is reused.
// aes.GenerateIV(); // This line is missing
aes.Mode = CipherMode.CBC;
// The IV used here is unpredictable/potentially zero
using (var encryptor = aes.CreateEncryptor(aes.Key, aes.IV))
// ... encryption logic ...
}
}
Mitigation and Best Practices
Let theAes.Create() or provider generate a random IV automatically (aes.GenerateIV() is often called by default, but relying on it implicitly can be risky). Retrieve the generated aes.IV after creating the encryptor/decryptor and prepend it to the ciphertext. Consider AesGcm.Secure Code Example
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// Services/EncryptionHelper.cs (Secure)
using System.Security.Cryptography;
using System.IO;
public class EncryptionHelper
{
private readonly byte[] _key;
public EncryptionHelper(byte[] key) { _key = key; } // Ensure key is strong & externalized
public byte[] EncryptRandomIv(byte[] data)
{
using (var aes = Aes.Create())
{
aes.Key = _key;
aes.Mode = CipherMode.CBC;
// SECURE: GenerateIV() creates a cryptographically random IV.
// It's often called implicitly, but call explicitly for clarity if needed.
aes.GenerateIV();
byte[] iv = aes.IV; // Get the generated IV
using (var encryptor = aes.CreateEncryptor(aes.Key, iv)) // Use the generated IV
using (var ms = new MemoryStream())
{
// SECURE: Prepend the IV to the output stream.
ms.Write(iv, 0, iv.Length);
using (var cs = new CryptoStream(ms, encryptor, CryptoStreamMode.Write))
{
cs.Write(data, 0, data.Length);
} // cs.FlushFinalBlock() is called automatically
return ms.ToArray();
}
}
}
public byte[] DecryptRandomIv(byte[] ivAndCiphertext)
{
using (var aes = Aes.Create())
{
aes.Key = _key;
aes.Mode = CipherMode.CBC;
byte[] iv = new byte[aes.BlockSize / 8]; // e.g., 16 bytes
// Read IV from the start of the data
Array.Copy(ivAndCiphertext, 0, iv, 0, iv.Length);
aes.IV = iv;
using (var decryptor = aes.CreateDecryptor(aes.Key, iv))
using (var ms = new MemoryStream())
{
using (var cs = new CryptoStream(ms, decryptor, CryptoStreamMode.Write))
{
// Write only the ciphertext part (after the IV)
cs.Write(ivAndCiphertext, iv.Length, ivAndCiphertext.Length - iv.Length);
}
return ms.ToArray();
}
}
}
}
Testing Strategy
Review code usingAes in CBC mode. Ensure aes.IV is either explicitly generated using aes.GenerateIV() or RandomNumberGenerator.Fill() within the encryption method, or that the framework generates it automatically. Verify the IV is retrieved after generation and prepended to the ciphertext. Check for static IV byte arrays.Framework Context
Usingopenssl_encrypt() with a CBC cipher (like aes-256-cbc) but providing a static or non-random IV.Vulnerable Scenario 1: Static IV
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// app/Utils/Encryption.php
class Encryption {
// DANGEROUS: Static IV.
const IV = '1234567890abcdef'; // Must match cipher length (16 for AES)
public function encryptStaticIv($key, $data) {
$ciphertext = openssl_encrypt(
$data,
'aes-256-cbc',
$key,
OPENSSL_RAW_DATA,
self::IV // Using static IV
);
return base64_encode(self::IV . $ciphertext); // Storing static IV isn't useful
}
}
Vulnerable Scenario 2: Non-Random IV (e.g., using time())
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// app/Utils/Encryption.php
public function encryptTimeBasedIv($key, $data) {
$cipher = 'aes-256-cbc';
$ivlen = openssl_cipher_iv_length($cipher);
// DANGEROUS: Using time() makes the IV predictable.
$iv = substr(md5(time()), 0, $ivlen);
$ciphertext = openssl_encrypt($data, $cipher, $key, OPENSSL_RAW_DATA, $iv);
return base64_encode($iv . $ciphertext);
}
Mitigation and Best Practices
Generate a random IV usingopenssl_random_pseudo_bytes(openssl_cipher_iv_length($cipher)) for each encryption. Prepend the IV to the ciphertext. Laravel’s Crypt::encryptString() handles this securely by default.Secure Code Example
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// app/Utils/Encryption.php (Secure)
class Encryption {
public function encryptRandomIv($key, $data) {
$cipher = 'aes-256-cbc'; // Or preferably 'aes-256-gcm'
$ivlen = openssl_cipher_iv_length($cipher);
// SECURE: Generate cryptographically strong random bytes for IV.
$iv = openssl_random_pseudo_bytes($ivlen);
$ciphertext = openssl_encrypt(
$data,
$cipher,
$key,
OPENSSL_RAW_DATA,
$iv // Use the random IV
);
// SECURE: Prepend the unique IV to the ciphertext.
return base64_encode($iv . $ciphertext);
}
public function decryptRandomIv($key, $data) {
$cipher = 'aes-256-cbc';
$ivlen = openssl_cipher_iv_length($cipher);
$raw = base64_decode($data);
$iv = substr($raw, 0, $ivlen);
$ciphertext = substr($raw, $ivlen);
return openssl_decrypt(
$ciphertext,
$cipher,
$key,
OPENSSL_RAW_DATA,
$iv // Use the extracted IV
);
}
}
Testing Strategy
Review calls toopenssl_encrypt using CBC mode. Ensure the IV parameter is generated using openssl_random_pseudo_bytes within the function or passed uniquely per call. Verify the IV is prepended. Check for hardcoded IV constants.Framework Context
Using Node’scrypto.createCipheriv() with CBC mode but providing a static, null, or predictable buffer as the IV.Vulnerable Scenario 1: Static IV
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// utils/encryption.js
const crypto = require('crypto');
const ALGORITHM = 'aes-256-cbc';
// DANGEROUS: Static IV (must be 16 bytes for AES).
const STATIC_IV = Buffer.from('abcdef9876543210abcdef9876543210', 'hex');
function encryptStaticIv(key, text) {
// Using static IV
const cipher = crypto.createCipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, STATIC_IV);
let encrypted = cipher.update(text, 'utf8', 'hex');
encrypted += cipher.final('hex');
return encrypted; // IV is not even included here!
}
Vulnerable Scenario 2: Null IV
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// utils/encryption.js
function encryptNullIv(key, text) {
// DANGEROUS: Using a zero-filled buffer as IV.
const nullIv = Buffer.alloc(16, 0);
const cipher = crypto.createCipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, nullIv);
// ... encryption ...
}
Mitigation and Best Practices
Generate a random IV usingcrypto.randomBytes(16) for each encryption. Prepend the IV (usually hex or base64 encoded) to the ciphertext, separated by a delimiter or by fixed length. Use AES-GCM (aes-256-gcm) instead if possible.Secure Code Example
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// utils/encryption.js (Secure)
const crypto = require('crypto');
const ALGORITHM = 'aes-256-cbc';
const IV_LENGTH = 16; // For AES
function encryptRandomIv(key, text) {
// SECURE: Generate random IV for each encryption.
const iv = crypto.randomBytes(IV_LENGTH);
const cipher = crypto.createCipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv);
let encrypted = cipher.update(text, 'utf8', 'hex');
encrypted += cipher.final('hex');
// SECURE: Prepend IV (as hex) to the ciphertext. Use a separator.
return iv.toString('hex') + ':' + encrypted;
}
function decryptRandomIv(key, text) {
const parts = text.split(':');
const iv = Buffer.from(parts.shift(), 'hex');
const encryptedText = Buffer.from(parts.join(':'), 'hex');
const decipher = crypto.createDecipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv);
let decrypted = decipher.update(encryptedText);
decrypted = Buffer.concat([decrypted, decipher.final()]);
return decrypted.toString();
}
Testing Strategy
Review code usingcrypto.createCipheriv with CBC mode. Ensure the iv parameter is generated using crypto.randomBytes(16) inside the encryption function or passed uniquely. Check that the IV is prepended/stored. Look for static Buffer definitions used as IVs.Framework Context
UsingOpenSSL::Cipher with a CBC cipher but setting the iv with a static or predictable value.Vulnerable Scenario 1: Static IV
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# lib/encryption.rb
require 'openssl'
class Encryption
# DANGEROUS: Static IV.
STATIC_IV = '1234567890abcdef'.freeze # Must match block size
def encrypt_static_iv(key, data)
cipher = OpenSSL::Cipher.new('aes-256-cbc')
cipher.encrypt
cipher.key = key
cipher.iv = STATIC_IV # Using static IV
encrypted = cipher.update(data) + cipher.final
# IV not included, but it's static anyway
return encrypted
end
end
Vulnerable Scenario 2: Null/Default IV
Forgetting to set the IV, which might default to zeros.Copy
# lib/encryption.rb
def encrypt_default_iv(key, data)
cipher = OpenSSL::Cipher.new('aes-256-cbc')
cipher.encrypt
cipher.key = key
# DANGEROUS: IV not set, might default to zeros or reuse internal state.
# cipher.random_iv # This is missing
encrypted = cipher.update(data) + cipher.final
return encrypted
end
Mitigation and Best Practices
Usecipher.random_iv to generate and set a cryptographically random IV for each encryption. Get the generated IV using cipher.iv and prepend it to the ciphertext.Secure Code Example
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# lib/encryption.rb (Secure)
require 'openssl'
class Encryption
def encrypt_random_iv(key, data)
cipher = OpenSSL::Cipher.new('aes-256-cbc')
cipher.encrypt
cipher.key = key
# SECURE: Generate a random IV for this operation.
iv = cipher.random_iv
# `cipher.iv = iv` is done implicitly by `random_iv` if not already set
encrypted = cipher.update(data) + cipher.final
# SECURE: Prepend the generated IV to the ciphertext.
return iv + encrypted
end
def decrypt_random_iv(key, iv_and_ciphertext)
cipher = OpenSSL::Cipher.new('aes-256-cbc')
# Extract IV length based on cipher block size
iv_len = cipher.iv_len
iv = iv_and_ciphertext[0...iv_len]
encrypted_data = iv_and_ciphertext[iv_len..-1]
cipher.decrypt
cipher.key = key
cipher.iv = iv # Use the extracted IV
decrypted = cipher.update(encrypted_data) + cipher.final
return decrypted
end
end
Testing Strategy
Review code usingOpenSSL::Cipher with CBC mode. Ensure cipher.random_iv is called (or IV is generated via SecureRandom.random_bytes) within the encryption method. Verify the IV is prepended. Check for static IV constants.
