Improper Access Control - Codepure Documentation

Overview

Improper Access Control occurs when an application fails to properly enforce what a user is allowed to do. This is different from authentication (who you are). This vulnerability means an authenticated user (e..g., a “viewer”) can perform actions reserved for a different role (e.g., an “admin”), such as accessing an admin panel or deleting data.

Business Impact

This is a critical vulnerability that can lead to full system compromise. A low-privilege attacker can escalate their privileges, modify or delete any data, and lock out legitimate administrators.

Reference Details

CWE ID: CWE-284 OWASP Top 10 (2021): A01:2021 - Broken Access Control Severity: High

Framework-Specific Analysis and Remediation

All frameworks provide powerful, declarative, and imperative ways to handle authorization. The vulnerability is almost always a developer forgetting to apply these controls to a new endpoint or function. The principle is “Deny by Default.”

Framework Context

Django and DRF provide view decorators (@login_required, @permission_required) and permission_classes on views. The vulnerability is a view that lacks these.

Vulnerable Scenario 1: A Missing Permission Check

An admin view is created that only checks if the user is logged in, not if they are an admin.

# reporting/views.py
from django.contrib.auth.decorators import login_required

@login_required
def generate_all_sales_report(request):
    # DANGEROUS: Any logged-in user can access this, not just staff.
    # It should check for `is_staff` or a specific permission.
    report = Sales.objects.generate_full_report()
    return HttpResponse(report, content_type="text/csv")

Vulnerable Scenario 2: DRF ViewSet

A DRF ModelViewSet that has no permission_classes set.

# api/views.py
class UserViewSet(viewsets.ModelViewSet):
    queryset = User.objects.all()
    serializer_class = UserSerializer
    # DANGEROUS: This ViewSet allows ANY authenticated user
    # (or even anonymous if default is AllowAny) to LIST, CREATE,
    # UPDATE, and DELETE users.
    # permission_classes = [permissions.IsAuthenticated] # Still too permissive!

Mitigation and Best Practices

For function-based views, use @user_passes_test(lambda u: u.is_staff). For class-based views, use UserPassesTestMixin. For DRF, set permission_classes explicitly, e.g., permission_classes = [permissions.IsAdminUser].

Secure Code Example

# reporting/views.py (Secure Version)
from django.contrib.auth.decorators import user_passes_test

@login_required
@user_passes_test(lambda u: u.is_staff)
def generate_all_sales_report(request):
    # SECURE: Now only staff members can access this view.
    report = Sales.objects.generate_full_report()
    return HttpResponse(report, content_type="text/csv")
    
# api/views.py (Secure Version)
from rest_framework import permissions

class UserViewSet(viewsets.ModelViewSet):
    queryset = User.objects.all()
    serializer_class = UserSerializer
    # SECURE: Only Admin users can access this ViewSet.
    permission_classes = [permissions.IsAdminUser]

Testing Strategy

Write integration tests where you authenticate as a non-admin user. Attempt to access the admin endpoint and assert that the response is a 403 Forbidden.

# reporting/tests.py
def test_sales_report_is_forbidden_for_normal_user(self):
    # self.client is logged in as a non-staff user
    response = self.client.get(reverse('sales-report'))
    self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)

Framework Context

Spring Security provides method-level security (@PreAuthorize, @Secured) and configuration-level security (http.authorizeRequests()). The vulnerability is a public endpoint that should be protected.

Vulnerable Scenario 1: Unprotected Controller Method

An admin-only method in a controller has no security annotation.

// controller/AdminController.java
@RestController
@RequestMapping("/admin")
public class AdminController {
    
    @GetMapping("/dashboard")
    public String getAdminDashboard() {
        // DANGEROUS: If the global config doesn't secure "/admin/**",
        // this endpoint is open to any user, or even anonymous.
        return "Admin Dashboard Data";
    }
}

Vulnerable Scenario 2: Weak Global Configuration

The WebSecurityConfigurerAdapter secures some paths but forgets the new admin path.

// config/SecurityConfig.java
@Override
protected void configure(HttpSecurity http) throws Exception {
    http.authorizeRequests()
        .antMatchers("/api/users/**").hasRole("USER")
        // DANGEROUS: The "/admin/**" path is forgotten and left open.
        .antMatchers("/", "/home").permitAll()
        .anyRequest().authenticated();
}

Mitigation and Best Practices

Apply method-level security as a “deny-by-default” policy. It’s safer to annotate each method than rely on global config. Enable method security with @EnableGlobalMethodSecurity(prePostEnabled = true).

Secure Code Example

Use @PreAuthorize on the method or controller.

// config/SecurityConfig.java (Secure)
@Configuration
@EnableGlobalMethodSecurity(prePostEnabled = true) // Enable method security
public class SecurityConfig extends WebSecurityConfigurerAdapter { ... }

// controller/AdminController.java (Secure Version)
@RestController
@RequestMapping("/admin")
@PreAuthorize("hasRole('ADMIN')") // SECURE: Applies to all methods in this controller
public class AdminController {
    
    @GetMapping("/dashboard")
    public String getAdminDashboard() {
        return "Admin Dashboard Data";
    }
}

Testing Strategy

Write a MockMVC test using @WithMockUser to simulate a request from a user without the ‘ADMIN’ role. Assert that the response is a 403 Forbidden.

@Test
@WithMockUser(roles = "USER") // Simulate as a regular user
void getAdminDashboard_asUser_shouldBeForbidden() throws Exception {
    mockMvc.perform(get("/admin/dashboard"))
        .andExpect(status().isForbidden());
}

Framework Context

ASP.NET Core Identity uses [Authorize] attributes. These can be applied to controllers or individual action methods. A missing attribute is a critical flaw.

Vulnerable Scenario 1: Missing Authorize Attribute

An AdminController is created, but the developer forgets to add the [Authorize] attribute.

// Controllers/AdminController.cs
// DANGEROUS: This entire controller is accessible by anonymous users.
public class AdminController : Controller
{
    public IActionResult Index() { ... }
    
    [HttpPost]
    public IActionResult DeleteUser(string id) { ... }
}

Vulnerable Scenario 2: Weak Role Check

The controller checks for authentication, but not for the specific “Admin” role.

// Controllers/AdminController.cs
[Authorize] // DANGEROUS: Any logged-in user can access this.
public class AdminController : Controller
{
    public IActionResult Index() { ... }
}

Mitigation and Best Practices

Apply [Authorize(Roles = "Admin")] to the controller. You can also define “Policies” in Startup.cs (e.g., policy.RequireRole("Admin")) and use [Authorize(Policy = "AdminOnly")].

Secure Code Example

// Controllers/AdminController.cs (Secure Version)
[Authorize(Roles = "Admin")] // SECURE: Only users in the "Admin" role can access.
public class AdminController : Controller
{
    public IActionResult Index() { ... }
    
    [HttpPost]
    public IActionResult DeleteUser(string id) { ... }
}

Testing Strategy

Write an integration test that authenticates a client as a normal user. The client then makes a request to the AdminController action and asserts a 403 Forbidden or a redirect to the login page.

[Fact]
public async Task AdminController_Index_ForbiddenForNormalUser()
{
    // _client is authenticated as a non-admin user
    var response = await _client.GetAsync("/Admin/Index");
    
    // Assert it's forbidden (or a redirect if not authenticated)
    Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.Forbidden, response.StatusCode);
}

Framework Context

Laravel uses “middleware” to protect routes. The vulnerability is defining a route in routes/web.php or routes/api.php that is not part of a middleware group.

Vulnerable Scenario 1: Route Outside Middleware Group

A developer adds a new admin route but forgets to put it inside the admin middleware group.

// routes/web.php

Route::middleware(['auth', 'admin'])->group(function () {
    Route::get('/admin/dashboard', [AdminController::class, 'dashboard']);
});

// DANGEROUS: This route is outside the group and accessible to anyone.
Route::get('/admin/delete-user/{id}', [AdminController::class, 'deleteUser']);

Vulnerable Scenario 2: Weak Gate/Policy

A Gate is defined for an action but the logic is flawed.

// app/Providers/AuthServiceProvider.php
Gate::define('view-admin-panel', function (User $user) {
    // DANGEROUS: Logic is missing, so it implicitly returns null (denies).
    // Or worse: `return $user->is_active;` (any active user is admin)
});

Mitigation and Best Practices

Ensure all admin-related routes are inside a Route::middleware([...])->group(...) block. Use policies (php artisan make:policy) to organize authorization logic for models.

Secure Code Example

// routes/web.php (Secure Version)

// SECURE: All routes in this group require auth and admin checks.
Route::middleware(['auth', 'admin'])->group(function () {
    Route::get('/admin/dashboard', [AdminController::class, 'dashboard']);
    Route.get('/admin/delete-user/{id}', [AdminController::class, 'deleteUser']);
});

// app/Providers/AuthServiceProvider.php (Secure Version)
Gate::define('view-admin-panel', function (User $user) {
    // SECURE: Explicitly check the user's role.
    return $user->role === 'admin';
});

Testing Strategy

Write a feature test. First, actingAs a non-admin user. Then, make a request to the admin-only route. Assert the response status is 403 Forbidden.

// tests/Feature/AdminAccessTest.php
public function test_normal_user_cannot_access_admin_panel()
{
    $user = User::factory()->create(['role' => 'user']);
    
    $response = $this->actingAs($user)
                     ->get('/admin/dashboard');

    $response->assertStatus(403);
}

Framework Context

Express relies entirely on middleware. Authorization is a custom middleware function that developers must write and apply. Forgetting to apply it is the vulnerability.

Vulnerable Scenario 1: Missing Route-Level Middleware

An admin route is defined without the corresponding ensureAdmin middleware.

// app.js
const ensureAuthenticated = (req, res, next) => { ... };
const ensureAdmin = (req, res, next) => {
    if (req.user && req.user.role === 'admin') return next();
    res.status(403).send('Forbidden');
};

app.get('/dashboard', ensureAuthenticated, (req, res) => { ... });

// DANGEROUS: This route is missing the 'ensureAdmin' middleware.
app.get('/admin/reports', ensureAuthenticated, (req, res) => {
    // Any logged-in user can access this.
    res.send('Admin Reports');
});

Vulnerable Scenario 2: Flawed Middleware Logic

The middleware logic is incorrect.

// app.js
const ensureAdmin = (req, res, next) => {
    // DANGEROUS: 'admin' (string) vs. true (boolean)
    // This check might always fail or pass incorrectly.
    if (req.user.isAdmin === 'true') return next(); 
    res.status(403).send('Forbidden');
};

Mitigation and Best Practices

Use app.use('/admin', ensureAdmin) to apply the middleware to all routes starting with /admin. This is a “deny-by-default” approach that’s safer than applying it to each route individually.

Secure Code Example

// app.js (Secure Version)
const ensureAdmin = (req, res, next) => {
    if (req.user && req.user.role === 'admin') {
        return next();
    }
    res.status(403).send('Forbidden');
};

// SECURE: Apply the 'ensureAdmin' middleware to all routes
// under '/admin'.
app.use('/admin', ensureAuthenticated, ensureAdmin);

// This route is now protected by the middleware above.
app.get('/admin/reports', (req, res) => {
    res.send('Admin Reports');
});

app.get('/admin/users', (req, res) => {
    res.send('Admin User List');
});

Testing Strategy

Use Jest/Supertest. Log in as a non-admin user (e.g., using a mock agent) and attempt to GET the /admin/reports endpoint. Assert the response status is 403.

// tests/admin.test.js
it('should forbid access to /admin/reports for non-admin users', async () => {
    // 'userAgent' is a supertest agent logged in as a 'user' role
    const response = await userAgent.get('/admin/reports');
    
    expect(response.statusCode).toBe(403);
});

Framework Context

Ruby on Rails uses before_action filters in controllers. The vulnerability is a controller action that is not covered by a before_action that checks for admin privileges.

Vulnerable Scenario 1: Action Not in `only` or `except`

A before_action is applied, but the new, dangerous action is forgotten.

# app/controllers/admin_controller.rb
class AdminController < ApplicationController
  before_action :require_admin, only: [:index]

  def index
    # This is protected
  end

  def delete_all_users
    # DANGEROUS: This action is not in the `only` list,
    # so it has no `before_action` filter.
    User.all.destroy_all
  end

  private
  def require_admin
    redirect_to root_path unless current_user&.admin?
  end
end

Vulnerable Scenario 2: Flawed Pundit/CanCanCan Policy

Using a gem like Pundit, but the policy logic is wrong.

# app/policies/post_policy.rb
class PostPolicy < ApplicationPolicy
  def destroy?
    # DANGEROUS: This allows a user to destroy a post if they
    # are the author OR an admin. But it should also check
    # that the record hasn't been published, for example.
    # This is "improper", not just "missing".
    user.admin? || record.user == user
  end
end

Mitigation and Best Practices

Apply before_action filters to the entire controller without only or except. This is “deny-by-default.” If some actions must be public, use skip_before_action on those specific, safe actions.

Secure Code Example

# app/controllers/admin_controller.rb (Secure Version)
class AdminController < ApplicationController
  # SECURE: This filter applies to EVERY action in this controller.
  before_action :require_admin

  def index
    # This is protected
  end

  def delete_all_users
    # This is now also protected
    User.all.destroy_all
  end

  private
  def require_admin
    redirect_to root_path, alert: "Access Denied" unless current_user&.admin?
  end
end

Testing Strategy

Write an RSpec request or controller spec. Log in as a non-admin user. post to the delete_all_users action and assert that the user count has not changed and that the response was a redirect.

# spec/requests/admin_spec.rb
it "prevents non-admins from deleting users" do
  create_list(:user, 5)
  login_as(create(:user, admin: false)) # Log in as non-admin
  
  expect {
    post delete_all_users_path
  }.to_not change(User, :count)
  
  expect(response).to redirect_to(root_path)
end

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Vulnerability Reference

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Releases & Roadmap

​Overview

​Business Impact

Reference Details

​Framework-Specific Analysis and Remediation

​Framework Context

​Vulnerable Scenario 1: A Missing Permission Check

​Vulnerable Scenario 2: DRF ViewSet

​Mitigation and Best Practices

​Secure Code Example

​Testing Strategy

​Framework Context

​Vulnerable Scenario 1: Unprotected Controller Method

​Vulnerable Scenario 2: Weak Global Configuration

​Mitigation and Best Practices

​Secure Code Example

​Testing Strategy

​Framework Context

​Vulnerable Scenario 1: Missing Authorize Attribute

​Vulnerable Scenario 2: Weak Role Check

​Mitigation and Best Practices

​Secure Code Example

​Testing Strategy

​Framework Context

​Vulnerable Scenario 1: Route Outside Middleware Group

​Vulnerable Scenario 2: Weak Gate/Policy

​Mitigation and Best Practices

​Secure Code Example

​Testing Strategy

​Framework Context

​Vulnerable Scenario 1: Missing Route-Level Middleware

​Vulnerable Scenario 2: Flawed Middleware Logic

​Mitigation and Best Practices

​Secure Code Example

​Testing Strategy

​Framework Context

​Vulnerable Scenario 1: Action Not in only or except

​Vulnerable Scenario 2: Flawed Pundit/CanCanCan Policy

​Mitigation and Best Practices

​Secure Code Example

​Testing Strategy

Overview

Business Impact

Framework-Specific Analysis and Remediation

Framework Context

Vulnerable Scenario 1: A Missing Permission Check

Vulnerable Scenario 2: DRF ViewSet

Mitigation and Best Practices

Secure Code Example

Testing Strategy

Framework Context

Vulnerable Scenario 1: Unprotected Controller Method

Vulnerable Scenario 2: Weak Global Configuration

Mitigation and Best Practices

Secure Code Example

Testing Strategy

Framework Context

Vulnerable Scenario 1: Missing Authorize Attribute

Vulnerable Scenario 2: Weak Role Check

Mitigation and Best Practices

Secure Code Example

Testing Strategy

Framework Context

Vulnerable Scenario 1: Route Outside Middleware Group

Vulnerable Scenario 2: Weak Gate/Policy

Mitigation and Best Practices

Secure Code Example

Testing Strategy

Framework Context

Vulnerable Scenario 1: Missing Route-Level Middleware

Vulnerable Scenario 2: Flawed Middleware Logic

Mitigation and Best Practices

Secure Code Example

Testing Strategy

Framework Context

Vulnerable Scenario 1: Action Not in `only` or `except`

Vulnerable Scenario 2: Flawed Pundit/CanCanCan Policy

Mitigation and Best Practices

Secure Code Example

Testing Strategy